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Summary
Conservative distrust of scientists regarding climate
change and evolution has been widely expressed in
public pronouncements and surveys, contributing to
impressions that conservatives are less likely to trust
scientists in general. But what about other topics, where
some liberals have expressed misgivings too? Nuclear
power safety, vaccinations, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are three often-mentioned
examples. For this report, five similarly worded survey
questions were designed to test the hypothesis that,
depending on the issue, liberals are just as likely to
reject science as conservatives. The five questions were
included along with many unrelated items in telephone
surveys of over 1,000 New Hampshire residents.
As expected, liberals were most likely and conservatives least likely to say that they trust scientists
for information about climate change or evolution.
Contrary to the topic-bias hypothesis, however, liberals also were most likely and conservatives least likely
to trust scientists for information about vaccines,
nuclear power safety, and GMOs. Liberal–conservative gaps on these questions ranged from 55 points
(climate change) to 24 points (nuclear power), but
always in the same direction. These results pose a
challenge for some common explanations of political
polarization in views about science.

Introduction
Scientists are in strong agreement that human activities, by altering the composition of Earth’s atmosphere,
are changing the climate and pushing it in directions
that we probably won’t like. Research showing evidence
of anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change
has been reviewed in detail for a series of reports by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change1 and

supported in statements by all of the leading organizations
of scientists.2 Independently conducted surveys of climate
scientists3 and analyses of published scientific reports4
find over 95 percent agreement on the existence of this
problem. This strong consensus among scientists comes
through clearly in discussions at professional meetings and
in new research papers published each month.
In contrast to the high level of agreement among
scientists, opinions among the U.S. public and politicians vary widely, largely along partisan lines.5 Survey
researchers find that climate-change questions are some
of the most divisive ones they ask.6 Majorities of liberals and moderates, but relatively few conservatives,
accept the scientific consensus that human activities are
changing Earth’s climate.7 Similar divisions appear on
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questions asking whether people believe there even is
a climate-change consensus among scientists.8 Liberals
and moderates, who tend to agree with the scientists
about climate change, also more often say they trust
scientists for information on this topic. Conservatives,
who tend to reject the scientific consensus, also are less
inclined to say they trust scientists. In Congress, some
conservative leaders have denounced climate studies as
a “hoax” and have sought to defund research activities,
including the use of satellites to study the Earth.9

Liberal misgivings about nuclear power and GMOs
are well known, but our question here is different:
is there evidence that liberals disproportionately
tend to distrust scientists, and favor other sources
instead, when it comes to evaluating the risks and
benefits in these publicly controversial areas?
Conservative distrust of science on climate change
illustrates a broader phenomenon of ideology-based
rejection that has been examined by many recent
studies.10 Some other prominent examples such as
evolution also involve mainly conservative opposition. Researchers and political analysts have looked for
examples of bias going the opposite direction, where
liberals rather than conservatives disproportionately
express distrust of scientists or reject a clear scientific
consensus. Evidence for opposite bias has been found
in experiments11 in which information was controlled—
such as reading a paragraph that makes a scientific
claim. Real-world examples of major domains in which
a scientific consensus was disproportionately rejected
by liberals are harder to identify, but three main possibilities have been suggested: vaccinations, nuclear
power safety, and GMOs. Evidence that liberals are
disproportionately biased against science on these topics has been anecdotal, however.12
One recent paper tested for topic biases by comparing results from two survey questions that asked people
whether they trust scientists for information about climate
change or about vaccines.13 As expected, trust in scientists
regarding climate change was higher among Democrats
and independents and lowest among Tea Party supporters.
Unexpectedly, trust in scientists regarding vaccines was
also higher among Democrats and independents and lowest among Tea Party supporters. These findings go against

claims that liberals disproportionately reject science on
vaccines in the same way that conservatives do on climate.
Neither the vaccine nor the climate change survey
question asks what people believe on these topics, but
simply whether they trust scientists as a source of information. Science is a process for systematically learning
about causes and effects, and the emerging knowledge
about vaccines is a case in point. An Institute of Medicine
review of scientific research on vaccines, for example,
found many instances in which fears of side effects
appeared unfounded, such as the alleged link between
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccination and
autism, but also noted instances in which genuine risks
were identified or the evidence remained too limited for
conclusions.14 Studies of individuals who express distrust
of scientists regarding vaccines have found them more
likely to credit information from non-science sources,
however, such as websites or people they know.15
Similar observations could apply to nuclear power
safety and GMOs. Both are important topics that draw
scientific attention, resulting in an extensive and diverse
record of research. However, both have also been topics
of controversy among the general public. Liberal misgivings about nuclear power and GMOs are well known,
but our question here is different: is there evidence that
liberals disproportionately tend to distrust scientists, and
favor other sources instead, when it comes to evaluating the risks and benefits in these publicly controversial
areas? In this brief, we test that hypothesis, and extend
the earlier climate change/vaccines comparison, using
data from more than 1,000 new survey interviews.

Do You Trust Scientists for Information
About...?
The Granite State Poll, run by the Survey Center at
the University of New Hampshire, conducts cell and
landline telephone interviews with random samples of
state residents four times each year. Although many of
its questions seek political opinions, the poll provides a
platform for research on other topics as well.16
The poll recently asked five “trust scientists” questions (see Box 1). Two of these, on climate change and
vaccines, were discussed in an earlier paper17 that used
data from New Hampshire surveys conducted in July
and October 2014 and a separate survey from Oregon.
In comparing responses across political parties, the
paper found that Democrats were most likely and Tea
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Box 1. Questions About Trust in Scientists
Would you say that you trust, don’t trust, or are
unsure about scientists as a source of information
about ...
•
•
•
•
•

Vaccines
Climate change
Nuclear power safety
Evolution
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs)

(The order of “trust” and “don’t trust” choices read
by interviewers was rotated to avoid bias.)
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Party supporters least likely to say they trust scientists
for information on either climate change or vaccines.
This brief broadens that analysis using additional data.
Two New Hampshire surveys conducted in April and
July 2015 asked new questions regarding trust in scientists for information about nuclear power safety, evolution, and GMOs.18 In addition to comparison by political
party, this brief compares attitudes by self-described
political ideology.
Responses to all five questions are graphed as bar
charts in Figure 1. Each chart also notes the number
of respondents (n) who were asked that question. A
large majority (71 percent) of the 2,489 respondents

FIGURE 1. TRUST IN SCIENTISTS AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON FIVE ISSUES

Note: N = number of respondants. Confidence intervals for these weighted percentages are within plus or minus 3 percentage points.
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who were asked the vaccine question said they trust
scientists for information on this topic (first panel).
Majorities also trust scientists regarding climate change
(62 percent), nuclear power safety (69 percent), and
evolution (63 percent). In each of these cases, less than
20 percent said they do not trust scientists.
Regarding GMOs, the level of trust drops below
half (47 percent), while distrust edges a bit higher (21
percent). These GMO responses do not necessarily
indicate a dimmer view of scientists, however. A previous survey asking different questions found that more
than 40 percent of respondents said they did not know
enough about GMOs to offer an opinion.19 Similarly,
32 percent here said they were unsure or did not know
about trusting scientists regarding GMOs, and some of
the remainder with low knowledge may have said “do
not trust,” boosting that percentage as well. Despite the

lower familiarity associated with GMOs, we included
this issue because it has been mentioned by some commentators as an area that would show liberal bias.
With this caveat about interpreting the GMO responses,
the Figure 1 results offer modest encouragement regarding
public trust in scientists. The following sections explore
how levels of trust vary with education and politics.

Education and Trust in Scientists
The earlier study mentioned above20 found that trust
in scientists on both climate change and vaccines is
higher among respondents with college education. The
same holds true in this expanded dataset and extends
to nuclear power, evolution, and GMOs (Figure 2). For
each of the five topics, the percentage who said they
trust scientists for information rises with education,

FIGURE 2. TRUST IN SCIENTISTS, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF RESPONDENT

Note: Number of respondents (n) and significance test probabilities (p) are given within each chart. In general, a p value below 0.05 (five chances in a hundred) is
considered significant, meaning there can be reasonable confidence a relationship exists in the larger population (New Hampshire adults) from which these random
samples were drawn. The probabilities here are much lower, below 0.001 or one chance in 1,000.
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producing a 23- to 34-point spread between respondents
with a high school education or less and those with postgraduate education. Regarding vaccines, the percentage rises from 57 to 80 percent, on climate from 50 to
74 percent, on evolution from 48 to 77 percent, and on
GMOs from 31 to 65 percent. All education/trust relationships depicted in Figure 2 are statistically significant,
as indicated by the probabilities (p) given in each chart.21

Partisan Divisions on Vaccines and
Climate Change
Figure 3 employs the four-party classification from the
study cited above22 to track partisan differences over
time in attitudes about vaccines and climate change.
Combining the results from the earlier study with our
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expanded dataset yields four surveys that asked the vaccines question and five that asked about climate change.
The up-and-down fluctuations in both plots appear
statistically random, meaning that they fall within the
normal variation expected from survey sampling. More
noteworthy is their common pattern. On both questions
across all of these surveys, Democrats expressed the most
trust in scientists, while Tea Party supporters expressed
the least. The views of independents and non-Tea Party
Republicans are not as distinct from each other, a finding
that also fits with earlier research.23
The vaccines result in the first panel of Figure 3 runs
opposite to claims that, on this topic, liberals would be
less likely than other groups to trust scientists. It lends
support instead to contrary claims that across diverse
science topics where there has been public controversy,

FIGURE 3. TRUSTS IN SCIENTISTS ON VACCINES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, BY POLITICAL IDENTIFICATION OF RESPONDENT
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liberals are more likely and conservatives less likely to
trust scientific evidence. However, Figure 3 involves
only two questions. The next section examines all five
of the trust-scientists items and compares them by
liberal to conservative ideology instead of by party.

Political Ideology and Trust in Scientists
The Granite State Poll routinely asks respondents to
place themselves on a nine-point scale from extremely
liberal to extremely conservative, with moderate (leaning neither way) in the center. Although the original
version of this scale has nine categories, analysis suggests that in practice some of these are not very different. For example, the distinction between “moderate,
leaning a little more toward the conservative side” (six

on the scale where five is plain moderate) and “somewhat conservative” (seven) does not seem to be sharp
in many people’s minds, judging by the similar answers
these two groups give to other questions. For our purposes it makes sense to use a simpler scheme with just
five categories: liberal, moderately liberal, moderate,
moderately conservative, or conservative.24
Figure 4 breaks down the percentage of trust-scientists
responses by ideology. Most of the ideology/trust relationships charted in Figure 4 are stronger than the education/
trust relationships charted in Figure 2. On topics from
vaccines to GMOs, liberals are most likely and conservatives least likely to say they trust scientists for information.
For example, 87 percent of liberals, 74 percent of moderates, and 56 percent of conservatives say that they trust
scientists for information about vaccines. Eighty-three

FIGURE 4. TRUST IN SCIENTISTS, BY IDEOLOGY OF RESPONDENT

Note: The number of respondents (n) and significance test probabilities (p) are given within each chart. In every case, the relationships are statistically significant, yielding
p values below 0.001.
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percent of liberals, 69 percent of moderates, and 59 percent of conservatives say they trust scientists for information about nuclear power safety. Seventy-three percent
of liberals, 46 percent of moderates, and just 31 percent
of conservatives say they trust scientists for information
about GMOs. Moderate liberals and moderate conservatives fill the spaces in between.
The vaccines, nuclear power, and GMO questions
were specifically chosen to test whether on those topics
liberals would be more inclined than conservatives
to reject science. In fact, the proportion of liberals
expressing trust in scientists is almost the same for
vaccines as it is for climate change, and not much lower
for nuclear power. Conservatives’ trust ranges from 24
to 55 points lower than liberals’ trust across all five science domains. These results overturn the proposition
that with this selection of topics we would find opposite and similarly strong ideological biases slanting
in both directions. If such opposite biases exist, their
effects are relatively weak, limited to narrowing the
liberal-conservative gap on some issues.

Discussion
The content of particular science domains undoubtedly affects public perceptions. Some authors go
a step further to argue that topical science-trust
questions (for example, whether you trust scientists
on climate change, or on nuclear power) basically
measure the same thing as questions asking about
your general attitudes regarding that topic.25 Others
have noted theory and data supporting the idea that
economic or policy implications associated with
particular science domains affect how people with
different ideologies view them. For example, liberals
tend to be more supportive of research on the environment, whereas conservatives prefer research that
supports economic production.26 Both the domainattitude and policy-implication theories must be
partly true, but neither predicts the unidirectional
pattern seen in Figure 4.
Our data include, of course, many liberals who
distrust scientists on each topic and many conservatives who do trust them. Some liberals who distrust
scientists regarding nuclear power safety, for example,
might be motivated by ideological or cultural reasoning, as are some conservatives regarding climate
change. The proportions in these groups are quite
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These results overturn the proposition that with
this selection of topics we would find opposite
and similarly strong ideological biases slanting in
both directions. If such opposite biases exist, their
effects are relatively weak, limited to narrowing
the liberal-conservative gap on some issues.
different, however. Only 17 percent of liberals say
they distrust or are unsure about scientists regarding
nuclear power safety, compared with 66 percent of
conservatives regarding climate change.
In a similar vein, experimental research has shown
that both liberals and conservatives exhibit bias in
evaluating scientific or scientific-sounding claims
that impinge on their political and cultural beliefs.27
Some evidence suggests such biases are more prevalent among conservatives, however.28 Statements
by conservative political leaders disparaging major
areas of science reinforce impressions from survey
and experimental data that science rejection, while
cutting both ways, remains more widespread on the
right than the left. Further indications come from
the observation that the science domains on which
the public is most politically polarized—climate
change and evolution—have predominantly conservative opposition.
Observing that such a pattern exists does not
explain why it exists. Contrasting liberal and conservative psychological characteristics have been
proposed as one type of theoretical explanation,29
sometimes termed the “intrinsic thesis.” In contrast,
the more sociological “contextual thesis” attributes
liberal/conservative differences on science to institutional and political factors, including the role of
media.30 Cultural identity and social-group influence
form part of the context as well.31 Judging the relative
importance of psychological and sociological factors
is beyond the scope of this brief. Figure 4 sketches a
reality, however, that any theory should address.
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